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Introductory Essay:
The Relevance of Gender Bias Studies
Blake D. Morant*
The work of this study is of abiding importance. It struck me that justice
is a woman, but she's been notoriously blind to the subtle but deeply
entrenched prejudices that are found in the legal system .... Gender
issues in legal education are ofprofound importance to our society and no
less critical, of course, is the study of gender bias matters which pervade
the administration ofjustice.'
. Introduction
In October 2000, the Commonwealth of Virginia joined over thirty-nine
other states in the completion of a sweeping gender bias study of its court
system.2 A diverse task force composed of twenty-three citizens3 appointed
* Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. BA, J.D.,
University of Virginia. I wish to express sincere gratitude to many at the Washington and Lee
University School of Law who made the Colloquium - Gender Bias in the Courts of the Com-
monwealth of Virginia - and these essays a reality. to the talented and distinguished jurists who
took the time to prepare comments and submit essays for this collection; to the Women Law
Students Organization for their invaluable efforts to arrange the colloquium; to Professor W.
Bradley Wendel for his insight on ethical issues implicated by gender bias in judicial decision
making-, and to Dean David Partlett, who readily and graciously provided the resources
necessary to bring the Colloquium to Washington and Lee. I also appreciate the dedicated
efforts of Ms. Alice Decker, my research assistant. Of course, completion of this Essay and the
success of the Colloquium are due in large measure to the support of Lynn Fitch, my secretary,
and Paulette J. Morant, my spouse.
1. Dean David E. Partlett, Washington and Lee University School of Law, Introductory
Comments, Colloquium on the Study of Gender Bias in the Courts of the Commonwealth of
Virginia, March 7,2001.
2. For a listing of states that have completed gender bias studies of their respective court
systems, see Myra C. Selby, Examining Race and Gender Bias in the Courts: A Legacy of
Indifference Or Opportunity?, 32 IND. L. REv. 1167, 1183 app. (1999).
3. The members of Virginia's Gender Bias Task Force were The Honorable Elizabeth B.
Lacy, Justice, Supreme Court of Virginia, Task Force Chair, Susan G. Anderson, National
Organization for Women, and Virginia Polytechnic and State University, SusanArmstrong, Esq.,
Mays & Valentine;'Miriam A. Bender, Esq., League of Women Voters; The Honorable Sam W.
Coleman Ill, Judge, Court ofAppeals of Virginia; Ms. Phyllis E. Galanti Brian K. Jackson, Esq.,
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by Chief Justice Henry Carrico of the Supreme Court of Virginia sought to
discover the extent to which gender inequity affected various aspects of the
judiciary. Completed near the end of the twentieth century, Virginia's study
functions as a referendum on the reality of gender neutrality in the profession
of law.4 This ambitious study's timing and exposure of the subtleties and per-
ception of bias in the judicial system expand its significance beyond the juris-
diction of the Commonwealth.
This issue of the Washington and Lee Law Review contains a notable
collection of Comments authored by four distinguished jurists who played
major roles in this historic study of gender bias in the courts of the Common-
wealth. These Comments memorialize remarks delivered in a live colloquium
at the Washington and Lee University School of Law on March 7, 2001, and
highlight significant observations and findings contained in the study. The
topics covered by the jurists include the study's genesis and methodology; the
effect of gender in matters of family law and domestic violence; possible
disparate treatment of women and men in criminal sentencing and civil
judgments; treatment of female lawyers, judges, and witnesses in various
judicial procedures and interactive contexts; and the practical implications of
gender in personnel hiring and promotion decisions.
General Counsel, Ukrop's Supermarkets, Inc.; Ms. Cynthia L Jessup, Clerk, Fifteenth Judicial
District; The Honorable Jerrauld C. Jones, Member, House of Delegates; C. Shireen Kirk, Eq.,
Flippen, Densmore, Morse, Rutherford & Jessee; Ms. Emily McCoy, Virginia National Organi-
zation for Women; The Honorable Tammy MeElyea, Commonwealth Attorney, Lee County; Ms.
Ruth 0. Micklem, Director, Virginians Against Domestic Violence; The Honorable William C.
Mims, Member, Senate of Virginia; Blake D. Morant, Professor of Law, Washington and Lee
University School of Law, The Honorable Jane Marum Roush, Judge, Nineteenth Judicial
Circuit; The Honorable Wilford Taylor, Jr., Judge, Eighth Judicial Circuit Ms. Eva S. Teig,
Senior Vice President, Virginia Power, The Honorable Wenda K. Travers, Judge, Thirty-First
Judicial District; The Honorable Philip Trompeter, Judge, Twenty-Third Judicial District; Ms.
Margaret B. Urquart, Chief Magistrate, First Judicial District; F. Blair Wimbush, Esq., General
Solicitor, Norfolk Southern Corporation; and The Honorable Judy L. Worthington, Clerk,
Twelfth Judicial Circuit.
4. I use the phrase "gender neutrality" to reference decision making and behavior that is
totally devoid of considerations of gender. For various discussions of the concept of gender neu-
trality as an aspiration, but not truly reflective of reality, see Shannon N. Ball, Note, Separate But
Equal Is Unequal: The ArgumentAgainst an All-Women 'sLaw School, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETIcs & PuB. POL'Y 171,194 (2001) (noting gender neutrality as goal, yet recognizing effect
of gender on perception); Nancy E. Dowd, Women's, Men's and Children Inequalities: Some
Reflections and Uncertainties, S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 587,597 (1997) (discussing
"the stark difference between the rhetoric of gender neutrality and the reality of gendered patterns
of nurturing"); Thomas C. Grey, Cover-Blindness, the 1998-99 Brennan Center Symposium
Lecture, 88 CAL. L. REV. 65,69 (2000) (stating that "[c]ivil rights laws ... were committed to
requiring blindness to all gender or race differentiations"); Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition 209,
47 DUIE L.J. 187, 325 (1997) (arguing that "the influence of race and gender is so relentless"
that gender or race neutrality "remains realistically out of reach").
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As the sole legal academic onthe Task Force, my scrutiny ofthis study has
been both empirical and theoretical. Empiricism relates to gender bias's mani-
festation revealed objectively in data gleaned through surveys, court observa-
tions, focus groups, reviews of records and databases, and public hearings.'
Data alone, however, fails to demonstrate the totality of bias's influence on
conduct and perceptions offairness. Human behavior intersects with attitudes
and beliefs, the precursors of bias. This basic theoretical tenet of human
behavior, explained through social psychological principles, confirms bias's
subtle and sometimes unavoidable effect on reasoning and perception.6
I. The Need to Study Possible Gender Bias in the Judiciary - The Subtlety
and Perception of Bias as Problematic Norms
A fundamental question overshadows Virginia's gender bias study and
the Comments from this Colloquium: why study the influence of gender in
judicial administration and decision making? Perhaps preliminary answers to
this query lie in ethical rules. Provisions of the American Bar Association's
(ABA) Model Code implore judges to administer justice objectively and
fairly, without regard to race or gender! Many federal and state jurisdictions
endorse the ABA's prescriptions, having adopted rules that proscribe and
hopefully discourage biased conduct by court officers.' Thus, studies like that
conducted in the Commonwealth gauge the effectiveness of these rules, raise
5. See GENDER BIAS iN THE COURTS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA - FINAL
REPORT at ii, 8,13 (2000) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT] (describing methodology of study).
6. See infra notes 26-39 and accompanying text (providing summary description of
social cognition, which explains impact of bias on decision making and behavior).
7. Several provisions of the ABA's Model Code of Judicial Conduct mandate unbiased
decision making. Canon 2C states that "[a] judge shall not hold membership in any organiza-
tion that practices invidious discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national
origin." Canon 3B(5) requires ajudge to
perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A judge shall not, in the
performance ofjudicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice,
including but not limited to bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion,
national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, and
shall not permit staff, court officials and others subject to the judge's direction
and control to do so.
Judges must also ensure that other participants in court proceedings refrain from biased behavior.
Canon 3B(6) proscribes that "[a] judge shall require lawyers in proceedings before the judge to
refrain from manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon [the categories in
3B(5)] against parties, witnesses, counsel or others. This Section does not preclude legitimate
advocacy when [the prohibited categories] are issues in the proceeding."
8. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Sweeping Reform From Small Rules?: Anti-bias Canons
as a Substitute For Heightened Scrutiny, 85 MINN. L. REV. 363,371 nn.23-24 (2000) (noting
state ethical rules).
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awareness of their import, and foster a more objective judiciary. Prescriptive
rules alone, however, fail to justify completely the need to study the preva-
lence of gender bias.
Present day demographics and social constructs of the modem judiciary
seemingly militate against the need for gender bias studies. To some, the study
of gender bias as it relates to the plight of women in the judiciary has become
a pass6 exercise of dubious utility.9 Objective data appears to buttress this
belief. The number of women jurists has increased steadily in the last twenty
years'" - roughly the period in which states have conducted gender bias
studies."1 Moreover, incidents of overt discrimination 2 against women in the
judicial setting have seemingly diminished overtime. 3 Isolated data fromthe
. 9. For example, a male attorney in the Roanoke, Virginia area, during a Task Force
sponsored public hearing on the Virginia study, asserted that, in his opinion, women attorneys
in the Roanoke area perform well and need little assistance in matters of acceptance or bias. See
generally FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 8-11 (discussing use of public hearings to gather data
about gender bias in Virginia's courts).
10. See Debra Baker, Plague in the Profession, A.BA. J., Sept. 2000, at 41 (stating that,
"[w]ith women now representing half of incoming law students and almost a third of all lawyers,
it seems odd that such harassment in the legal profession continues to any degree"); Rebecca
Korzec, Working on the 'Mvommy-Track": Motherhood and Women Lawyers, 8 HASTINGS
WOMEN's L.J. 117, 120-21 (1997) (noting that "[a]lthough the number of women lawyers has
increased dramatically, the achievements of women measured in traditional terms are disap-
pointing"); Debora L. Threedy, Feminists and Contract Doctrine, 32 IND. L. REV. 1247,1247
(1999) (citing KATHARE T. BARTLETT & ANGELA P. HARRIS, GMDER AND LAW: THEORY,
DocrNm, CommENTARY750-51 (2d ed. 1998) (assertingthat "number ofwomen law students,
lawyers and judges has increased dramatically")). Baker further notes that "with the increased
number of female lawyers has come a greater fear, at least among some men, that their position
in the profession is being threatened." Baker, supra, at 41; see also Barbara Allen Babcock,
Feminist Lawyers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1703 (1998) (reviewing VIRGINIA DRACHMAN,
SISTERS IN THE LAW: WOMEN LAWYERS IN MODERN AMERICAN HISTORY (1998)) (noting
"astonishing increase in thenumber of women lawyers").
11. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (noting the previous gender bias studies com-
pleted in other states).
12. See Susanne M. Browne, Note, Due Process and Equal Protection Challenges to
the Inadequate Response of the Police in Domestic Violence Situations, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
1295, 1315 (1995) (distinguishing overt and covert gender discrimination). See generally
Heather Nelson, "Fatal in Fact"?: An Examination of the Viability ofAffirmative Action for
Women in the Post-Adarand Era, 21 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 151 (2000) (describing programs
designed to remedy inequitable results of years of overt discrimination against women and
minorities).
13. See CYNTmAFUcHS EPSTEIN, WOMENINLAW 183 (2d ed. 1993) (noting increasingly
larger recruiting pool among law firms); Mary Becker, The Sixties Shift to FormalEquality and
the Courts: An Argument for Pragmatism and Politics, 40 WA. & MARY L. REV. 209, 260
(1998) (noting that overt discrimination against women has diminished significantly). But see
Martha W. Barnett, Women Practicing Law: Changes in Attitudes, Changes in Platitudes, 42
FLA. L. REV. 209,212-16,218 (1990) (noting continued, albeit diminished, existence of gender
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Virginia study lends some support to these views.14
The intuitive and subtle nature of bias, however, argues against the as-
sumption of a completely objective judiciary. Despite more positive data
suggesting that discrimination against women has diminished,15 the Virginia
study strongly acknowledges the prevalence of subtle gender bias. 6 In fact,
testimony and statistical information from Virginia's study supports the notion
that a number of men and women perceive some degree of gender bias on a
subtle unconscious and, sometimes, conscious level.'7 An excerpt of the
testimony of a member of the Virginia Women's Attorney Association cap-
tures succinctly the complexity of subtle gender bias:
[Genderbias] hasbeenreducedto some subtleties. As one ofmycolleagues
mentioned, it's sometimes difficult to put a finger on it .... But it's those
subtle genderbiases that are sort of difficult to identify .... It's a feeling
you get And those feelings are manifested when you do have a client that
believes possibly a male attorney would be better for them or a female
attorney would be better for them, for whatever reason. Maybe the male
judge willlike myfemale attorneybetter. Maybethemalejudgewentto law
school with my male attorney.'"
The public's perception that decision making is biased also looms as a
serious challenge for the judiciary. Virginia's study documents several areas
of perceived bias or, at the least, a belief that judicial decision makers are
insensitive to the issues of gender. A notable number of female family law
attorneys, female prosecutors, and family service providers believe that judges
fail to appreciate the dynamics of domestic abuse.'9 Various constituent
barriers); John P. Heinz et al, Lawyers and Their Discontents: Findings from a Survey of the
Chicago Bar, 74 IND. L.J. 735, 739 (1999) (finding that while overt discrimination has become
less common, women continue to experience adverse treatment in form of structural barriers and
covert expressions of hostility toward their presence in legal profession).
14. Testimony and surveys from the Virginia study suggest that overt discrimination
against women seemingly exists in the rarest of instances, and that gender bias is less prevalent
today than in past years. See FINALREPORT, supra note 5, at 11 (noting decline of overt gender
bias). But see id. at 35 (indicating judiciary's seeming bias against victims of domestic vio-
lence); id. at 47 (alluding that fathers face more obvious bias in decisions related to custody of
young children).
15. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text (noting decrease of overt gender dis-
crimination).
16. See FINALREPORTsupra note 5, at 97-98 (noting continuing problem of gender bias).
17. Id. at 15, 19, 60 (noting subtle gender bias in certain family law matters, court dynam-
ics, and criminal sentencing).
18. Id. at20.
19. See id. at 34 n.28 (articulating perception that judges do not appreciate dynamic of
domestic violence).
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groups, including fathers and family law attorneys, think that judges discrimi-
nate against men in child custody, visitation, and support decisions.
20
Both the manifestation of unconscious or subtle bias and the perception
that it exists potentially compromise judicial integrity and undermine public
confidence in the judicial system. 2' Few would argue that overtly biased
behavior demands affirmative efforts that sanction the perpetrator and dis-
courage future, similar conduct. But if true judicial objectivity remains a
universal goal, overt behavior cannot operate as the sole trigger for the imple-
mentation of bias reduction measures.' The perception of bias or its subtlemanifestation compels affirmative action, such as periodic studies of the court
system, to ensure the judiciary's continued viability.'
Substantiation of subtle or unconscious bias, however, remains problem-
atic.24 It is difficult to document the prevalence of biased attitudes without
discernable proof. This, in turn, prompts outright denial of bias or a reluc-
tance to take proactive action to minimize its possible effects.' Perhaps no
simple, definitive methodology can confirm bias's unconscious operation.
Social psychologists, however, verify biased behavior as a natural cognitive
function. As summarily presented below, psychological principles establish
the nexus between the natural function of human decision making and resul-
tant biased conduct.
20. See id. at 48-49 (noting male perception of male-based discrimination). For more on
the public's perception of bias in the Virginia judiciary, see infra note 23 and accompanying
text
21. See Brown, supra note 8, at 441 (quoting Texas Judicial Conduct Commission's
finding that biased statements of judges lessen public confidence in judiciary and diminish
judicial integrity).
22. For more regarding bias reduction, see infra note 39 and accompanying text.
23. Gender and racial bias studies conducted in other jurisdictions also document the
public's perception of bias, regardless of the lack of documented manifestation of biased
behavior. See FINALREPORT, supra note 5, at 53 (indicating that state task forces struggle with
perception versus reality of bias and concluding that "perceptions of bias threaten a court system
that stands for fairness"); see also Commission on Gender, Commission on Race & Ethnicity,
Report of the Third Circuit Task Force on Equal Treatment in the Courts, 42 VILL. L. REV.
1355, 1380, 1506 (1997) (noting on-going duty of courts to reduce perceptions of unequal
treatment); Jeannette F. Swent, Gender Bias at the Heart of Justice: An Empirical Study of
State TaskForces, 6 S. CAL REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUDS. 1, 53 (1996) (discussing perception
of gender bias).
24. See Castellano v. LindenBd. ofEduc., 400A.2d 1182,1188-89 (N.J. 1979) (Handler,
J., concurring and dissenting) (noting that discrimination often goes unremedied given difficulty
of detection).
25. For more regarding the substantiation of bias and its effects, see Blake D. Morant,
Law, Literature, and Contract: AnEssay in Realism, 4 Mica .RACE & L. 1,25 (1998) (noting
evidence of bias and perception in consumer context).
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1I. Social Cognition Substantiates the Existence ofBias
in Decision Making
The study of bias and its resultant effect on decision making and percep-
tion require a rudimentary understanding of the cognitive processes inherent
in human behavior. While anecdotal evidence suggests that individuals may
rely upon attitudes and preformed beliefs in their decision making processes, 26
social scientists provide a more compelling methodology that confirms the
reality of this conduct. Social psychologists, who often study the influences
of perception on human behavior, label this phenomenon social cognition.27
Pursuant to this theory, individuals, as a natural cognitive process, utilize
mental shortcuts to process information. This is a natural occurrence. A
plethora of information often bombards individuals and, consequently, com-
pels the use of abbreviated mechanisms for individuals to process this data
efficiently.' Such mechanisms often include categorizations29 or stereotypes,
the mental shortcuts that speed cognitive processes.3 0 The Virginia study
provides an example of how individuals can be stereotyped in the judicial
system. In the following excerpt of testimony from one of the Task Force's
public hearings, the witness notes her confrontation with gender and racial
stereotypes as she functions in the court system:
In terms of how women attorneys or litigants are treated in the court, for
the most part, I honestly believe that people try to be fair. They try to be
26. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 15, 48 (reporting testimony of custodial fathers
and family law attorney surveys indicating that certain judges exhibited preference for mother
as custodial parent of young children).
27. See ELUOTARONSON, THE SocLALANIMAL 117-20 (7th ed. 1995) (describing effect
of social cognition). See generally Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing
the Results: The Role of Lawyers in TransmittingLegalRules, 5 S. CAL. INTEIsc. L.L 375,
419 (1997) (discussing cognitive bias among lawyers).
28. See ARONSON, supra note 27, at 117-20 (analyzing behavior as partly function of
environmental factors). See generally Hal R. Arkes, Costs and Benefits of Judgment Errors:
ImplicationsforDebiasing, 110 PSYCHOL. Bu.T_ 486 (1991) (noting efficiency in streamlining
informational processes, which ultimately affects behavior).
29. See ARONSON, supra note 27, at 141-45 (explaining that categorization into groups
leads to stereotype formation that then influences expectation).
30. Stereotypes consist of acquired or learned beliefs, generally associated with distinct
groups. See Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled
Components, 56 . PERSONATY & Soc. PSYCHoL. 5, 6 (1989) (distinguishing between auto-
matic and controlled human information processing); Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist
Case for Afflirmative Action in LegalAcademia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705, 710 (1990) (discussing
development of racial stereotypes); Mary F. Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the Promotion of
Women to Positions of Power, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 471, 489 (1990) (discussing stereotyping
process).
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fair. They try to do well. You still get subtle biases that are based on
people's politeness, their basic perception of how - who people are. You
know, I'mablackwoman. People think, ohyoumustbethelitigant. Well
no, I'm really the attorney. I'm here today to represent someone.3 '
The social psychological literature calls the use of cognitive shortcuts
such as stereotypes "heuristics." This process happens naturally and unknow-
ingly as an impulsive response mechanism. It functions to speed the process-
ig of information.32 Left unchecked, however, the use of heuristics may
contribute to errors in reasoning and judgment.33
If implemented by decision makers, heuristics can result in the employ-
ment of biases and prejudices. 4 Because these influences generally function
tacitly or unconsciously,35 they may distortjudgment. This is particularly true
if the decision maker fails to recognize distinctions between the perceived
individual and the group to which that individual belongs.36 This behavior
31. FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 23.
32. See ARONSON, supra note 27, at 135-40 (1995) (discussing judgment heuristics);
Steven J. Sherman & Eric Corty, Cognitive Heuristics, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNIION,
189, 193-95 (Robert S. Wyer, Jr. & Thomas K Srull eds., 1984) (discussing judgmental heur-
istics as tool for processing information). See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAUiTY:
HEURIsTIcs AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1974).
33. See ZvAKUNDA, SOcLALCOGNrnON: MAKINGSENsE oFPEOPLE 53-110 (1999) (dis-
cussing problem of relying on heuristics rather than on statistical rules).
34. See Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: HelpingLegalDecision-makers Break
the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733,742 (1995) (noting difference between having knowl-
edge of stereotype and believing stereotype).
35. See John A. BarghAuto-Motives: PreconsciousDeterminants of Social Interaction,
in2 HANDBOOKOFMOIVATIONAND COGNIrION: FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIALBEHAVIOR 93,94
(E. Tory Higgins & Richard M. Sorrentino eds., 1990) (discussing "unintentional, preconscious
activation of social stereotypes"); Martha Chamallas, The Architecture ofBias: Deep Structures
in TortLaw, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463,472 (1998) (discussing unconscious role race and gender
may play in decision ofjuror). For more regarding unconscious bias, see also Barbara J. Flagg,
"Was Blind, But Now I See'" White Race Consciousness and the Requirement ofDiscrimina-
toryIntent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 983-85 (1993) (noting frequency of unconscious racial bias);
Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-
EnforcingStateAction, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111,1136 (1997) (noting existence of discrimination
behind facially-neutral statutes). See generally Charles R. Lawrence B, The Id, the Ego, and
EqualProtection: Reckoning with UnconsciousRacism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (discuss-
ing problems with discrimination/purpose doctrine). Psychology Professors Anthony Green-
wald of the University of Washington and Mahzarin Banaji of Yale University have released
results from their Implicit Association Test that reveal that ninety to ninety-five percent of
people who took the test have unconscious racial bias. See Roots of Racism Revealed, at
http'/abenews.go.com/sections/livingfInYourHead/allinyourhead_ll.html (last visited Oct. 26,
2001).
36. Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 27, at 420 nA; see also D.F. Wyatt & D.T.
Campbell, On the Liability of Stereotype or Hypothesis, 46 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYcH. 496,
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often becomes the catalyst for bias by the decision maker who is unaware of
these influences.37
Remedies for bias, conscious or unconscious, require conscientiousness-
raising techniques that alert individuals of their potential cognitive flaws.
Awareness then prompts possible rejection of bias and thwarts its negative
influence on decision making. Bias reduction efforts are compulsory elements
in any strategy to minimize the effects of biased behavior." Consistent edu-
cation on the cognitive operation of heuristical behavior raises awareness of
bias and becomes a staple in any strategy to reduce its negative effects. Vir-
ginia's study acknowledges education as a critical component of its gender
bias reduction strategy, stating that "[tihe most effective means to eliminate
gender bias in the court system is continual education of lawyers, judges, and
court personnel."
39
IV The Study of Gender Bias to Ensure Reasoned Decision Making
Courts administer justice.4° That function generally requires decision-
makers to apply legal rules to disparate situations.4 1 The intended results are
498 (1951) (discussing results of experiment involving altered perceptions as result of stereotyp-
ing). For an example of distorted judgment due to heuristics, see supra note 31 and accom-
panying text (noting possible erroneous categorization of African-American, female attorney).
37. Because of the limited scope of this Essay, the description of heuristics herein is pur-
posefully brief. The goal is to provide some basic understanding of the social psychological
implications of decisionmaking. For a detailed explanation of heuristics, see generally ABC
RESEARCH GROUP, SIMPLE HEuRiSTICS THAT MAKE Us SMART (Gerd Gigerenzer & Peter Todd
eds., 1999) (presenting different viewpoints on heuristics).
38. See Armour, supra note 34, at 757-60 (endorsing tactics that prompt individuals to
employ nonprejudicial beliefs in their thought processes).
39. FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 97. For the specific areas where the Virginia Task
Force recommends the establishment or enhancement of educational programs to raise awareness
of gender bias's tacit operation, see id. at 25 (suggesting education committee for judges); id. at
26 (requesting enhancement of Virginia Continuing Legal Education); id. at 39-40 (requesting
judicial education on domestic abuse and enforcement of protective orders); id. at 44-45 (requir-
ing education courses regarding rules for access to marital funds and award of attorney's fees);
id. at 51 (advocating education programs regarding stereotypes in child custody decisions); id.
at 55 (recommending programs that educate judges on spousal support guidelines and deviations
therefrom); id. at 79 (requesting programs that instruct on use of gender-neutral language); and
id. at 94 (supplementing new judges' course to include awareness of gender bias issues).
40. See Peralta v. United States, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 434,439 (1865) (noting necessity of
applying "fixed rules" in administration ofjustice).
41. SeeAkhil ReedAmarIniratextualism, 12 HARv. L.REV. 747,765 (1999) (describing
historically requirement that courts apply constitution as law to cases); Scott Fruehwald, Prag-
matic Textualism and the Limits of Statutory Interpretation: Dale v. Boy Scouts ofAmerica, 35
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 973,1001-02 (2000) (noting value of pragmatic textualism as mechanism
which fosters courts' traditional role of applying law to case facts).
1081
58 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1073 (2001)
objective and reasoned decisions.42 Yet human decision making, which usually
intersects with attitudes and beliefs, can sometimes defy objectivity.
Legal decision making can be an unpredictable exercise. Legal rules,
those who apply and administer those rules, and individuals subject to those
rules form a complex matrix of divergent interests and often diverse beliefs.
Conflicting beliefs and biases of those in that matrix can impact or distort
seemingly impartial decisions. Thus, systemic gender and racial bias studies,
like those conducted in Virginia and other states,43 constitute critical tools that
reveal the influence of bias and prompt implementation of measures that
counteract its influence on judicial decision making.
Bias, whether it be gender or any other form,"4 strikes at the very heart
of reasoned decision making. Virginia's study and the Comments that follow
this Essay reveal a stark reality, despite the inadvertence of overt discrimina-
tory behavior or actual proof of biased conduct, 45 the subtle remnants of bia
4 6
and its perceived operation in judicial decision making47remain formidable
challenges for Virginia and otherjurisdictions. The elimination of gender bias
or any other form of bias becomes a difficult, yet perpetual goal. It also forms
the predicate for the continual study of possible biased conduct of members
of the judiciary.
A compelling feature of the gender bias study in Virginia is its uncanny
timing. As previously noted, history reveals that incidents of overt bias were
more numerous in past years. 4' Earlier studies have documented the influences
of bias and have led to efforts designed to counter its negative effects. 49 But
42. Courts generally administer justice through the implementation of fixed rules, coupled
with experience and wisdom necessary to foster a just result See generalp Quirk v. Rooney,
62 P. 825 (Cal. 1900) (applying res judicata); Gentile Bros. Co. v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 10
So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1942) (defining statutory language via common law principles); Davis v. J.C.
Nichols Co., 761 S.W.2d 735 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (emphasizing authority ofordinance).
43. See sulpra note 2 and accompanying text (noting prevalence of studies).
44. Bias can be based on race as well as gender. For states which have studied the preva-
lence of racial bias in their respective court systems, see Selby, supra note 2, app. at 1183; see
also William B. Rubenstein, Queer Studies IL Some Reflections on the Study of Sexual Orien-
tation Bias in the Legal Profession, 8 U.C.LA WOMEN'S L.. 379, 381-2 (1998) (discussing
development of racial, gender, and sexual orientation bias studies within jurisdictions).
45. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text (describing decline of overt discrimina-
tion).
46. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (noting continued presence of subtle
bias).
47. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (describing perception ofjudicial bias).
48. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (noting historically higher incidences
of overt bias).
49. For the cites to gender and racial bias studies performed by states other than Virginia,
see Selby, supra note 2, app. at 1183.
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those studies, conducted during periods ofchanging demographics and cultural
adjustments in the legal profession," seemingly had a greater sense of contex-
tual urgency. The more blatantly discriminatory atmosphere for women who
worked in the judiciary years ago easily justified concerted efforts to stem
biased behavior.51 The Task Force in Virginia, on the other hand, performed
its study in a climate that was less hostile to women.52 That context might have
fueled the argument that the judiciary need not implement measures to ensure
gender neutrality.
Yet Virginia's gender bias study, performed during the dawn of the new
millennium, becomes a important barometer of genuine progress toward judi-
cial objectivity. From the inception of gender bias studies in the 1980s to
Virginia's completed study in the year 2000, pundits can evaluate both the
reality of a gender-neutral judiciary and the public's perception of judicial
fairness. The Virginia study, and the Comments that follow, become impor-
tant contemporary commentaries on the inescapable intersection between
human cognition and the application of law.
In her Comment, Justice Elizabeth B. Lacy provides the contextual back-
ground for the study of gender bias in Virginia's court system. She notes the
methodology employed to perform the study and the organizational framework
for the task force and staffmembers who conducted the study. Her Comment
also provides a historical description of the objective for the study, which is to
examine what gender bias is and to discover its operations both overtly and
subtly.
Perhaps the most polemic portion of the Virginia study included the
examination of gender bias in matters of domestic relations and domestic
violence. Judge Philir Trompeter highlights the most exemplary findings of
bias within certain aspects of domestic relations matters such as divorce, child
support, and child custody. Judge Trompeter's Comment further describes the
manifestation of bias as it relates to the judiciary's handling of domestic
violence matters. His Comment portrays the subtle nature of gender bias, its
more obvious manifestations as it relates to child custody, and the difficult
pathology of domestic violence.
Judge Jane Marum Roush then provides an overview ofthe manifestation
of bias in various substantive law matters related to the judiciary's sentencing
of defendants and the authoring and interpretation of criminal laws that relate
50. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text (noting steady increase of women
jurists).
51. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text (describing changing demographics of
legal profession in context of overt bias).
52. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (noting increase in number of women in
various roles injudiciary).
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to parties of different genders. Most notable in Judge Roush's Comment is
the effect of the gender bias study on matters of statutory law: she highlights
the Virginia legislature's response to problems uncovered by the study.
In the final Comment, Judge Sam Coleman III pragmatically focuses on
the operation of gender bias in various matters related to the courts' physical
facilities and general operation. He highlights the treatment of women as both
attorneys and litigants. It is important to note here the subtlety of bias in the
judiciary's treatment of court participants of different genders. Judge Cole-
man particularly highlights some women's disparate treatment, which is per-
ceived by women, but not by male members of the judiciary. He also reveals
the subtlety of gender bias in such matters as physical space and the availabil-
ity of comfort facilities for women who conduct business in the courthouse.
As you read and contemplate the following Comments, recall the recur-
rent postulate contained in this Essay. Tacit recognition ofthe gender ofthose
who participate in court proceedings or operations may consciously or uncon-
sciously lead to biased decision making. Gender consciousness also impacts
the public's perception of the fairness of those decisions. Raised awareness
of this phenomenon of human behavior, and the need to counter its effects,
will be the thematic legacies of this insightful collection of Comments.
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